Following a massive protest movement in Bangladesh that toppled the government of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, politicians, civil society, students, diplomats, United Nations rights experts, and others quickly started work with an interim government to bring lasting reforms. Led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, the interim government took office on August 8, 2024, pledging to undo the damage to human rights and democracy during the Hasina administration’s 15 years in office. As Chief Advisor Yunus told Prothom Alo:
After winning the 2009 election, Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League party-led government had gradually consolidated power by silencing critics, harassing activists, and arbitrarily arresting, forcibly disappearing, and killing members of the opposition or civil society who spoke out against her. In January 2024, Sheikh Hasina won a fourth consecutive term in office after her administration again refused to hold credible elections, marking a decade since Bangladeshis had been able to exercise their right to choose their leaders. During her reign, the Hasina-led government effectively captured key institutions that otherwise could offer independent oversight and justice including the election commission, the human rights commission, the police, and the judiciary, ensuring that they instead served to keep the Awami League in office.
On August 5, 2024, Hasina was finally forced to leave office after three weeks of student-led street protests, described by some Bangladeshis as the Monsoon Revolution.
The interim government has committed to holding free and fair elections after repairing the security sector, the justice system, and other core institutions. The interim government has also said that it will bring legislative changes through presidential order, which will later be ratified by an elected parliament.
While embarking upon these critical steps, the interim government is also contending with powerful and politicized security forces that have long benefited from a system of impunity. Due to the deeply ingrained systemic obstacles to accountable governance, a disturbingly familiar pattern of security force abuses and political reprisals has reemerged, this time targeting perceived Awami League supporters. Groups promoting extremist Islam are attacking minorities, particularly those from Hindu and Ahmadiyya communities. Ethnic minorities in the Chittagong Hill Tracts endure continued discrimination and violence by the authorities. While the interim government has introduced a new ordinance to replace an abusive law used to crush freedom of speech under the Awami League, the new legislation unfortunately replicates many of the same harmful provisions.
Student leaders and activists are expressing concern that the interim government is being hemmed in by various political interests at home and abroad. Many are worried that the pace of reforms has slowed down. As one student leader said:
Bangladeshis have called for rights respecting governance. This effort, led by a fragile interim government that seeks to remain politically neutral, must be robustly supported by donors, international experts, and civil society. Most significantly, the criminal justice system should uphold international standards on the presumption of innocence and the right to due process as perpetrators of serious human rights violations are identified through investigations.
To ensure effective reforms, the government has sought input from stakeholders. This report draws on over 20 years of Human Rights Watch reporting on abuses in Bangladesh— both under the Hasina administration and by those before her, as well as interviews with human rights activists, members of the interim government, and current and former law enforcement and military officials—to set out the structural reforms needed for lasting change.
The Monsoon Revolution
Violence first erupted on July 15, 2024, when the ruling Awami League party supporters and police attacked students peacefully protesting discriminatory and politicized quotas in government jobs. Students across the country launched protests in response. The Hasina government deployed security forces who used tear gas, stun grenades, and rubber and live bullets, shooting indiscriminately into crowds and directly at students. As one police officer told Human Rights Watch, “I witnessed officers firing at vital organs…. In many cases, I witnessed live ammunition being fired even when officers’ lives were not in danger.” Another described witnessing senior officers in the Dhaka Metropolitan Police Headquarters watch live CCTV footage and direct officers on the ground to shoot protesters like “they were ordering someone to shoot in a video game.”
A July 16 video spread rapidly on social media showing university student Abu Sayed standing, his arms outstretched, as police repeatedly shot at him. After his death, and the deaths of others, outraged students across the country came out in the streets and were later joined by ordinary citizens and opposition supporters. The protests soon expanded to represent opposition to Hasina’s autocratic rule, characterized by security force abuses, widespread repression, and corruption, with slogans calling for her resignation.
As protests spread, the authorities instituted a strict curfew enforced with a “shoot-on-sight” order, imposed a nationwide internet shutdown, and arrested thousands of people. One student, Mohammad Rahat Husain, described to Human Rights Watch being shot at by police when he and his friends were sitting at a teashop during the curfew. Despite hiding inside the shop, police charged inside and told the students to run. But when one of his friends, Tayem, started to run, police shot him from behind.
Despite the grave risks, thousands continued to protest.
On August 4, protesters marched towards the prime minister’s residence demanding that she resign. Hasina responded by reportedly calling on officials “to curb anarchists with iron hands.” But as the streets filled with protesters threatening to overrun government buildings, on August 5, Sheikh Hasina fled the country. Now exiled in India, she has claimed that she left to prevent further bloodshed and has denied any wrongdoing.
The Yunus administration, alongside Students Against Discrimination, the group that had led the protests, continue to update the list of those killed. As of December 2024, they confirmed at least 858 deaths. Another nearly 250 people, including policemen, were killed in retributive violence after Hasina’s resignation.
Interim Government
Within weeks of taking power, the Yunus administration released thousands of people who had been detained during the protests and made commitments to pursue accountability for torture, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances, and ensure human rights protections. It has said it will drop police investigations and charges against peaceful critics of Sheikh Hasina, her relatives and associates, and her administration. At least 30 police officials were arrested for their alleged involvement in using unlawful force against protesters during the Monsoon Revolution.
The interim government also invited the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to investigate abuses by government forces during the protests and their root causes.
A commission of inquiry into all enforced disappearances, established on August 27, has made significant progress in identifying secret detention sites and has named some perpetrators, a monumental step after years of denials by the previous government. The interim government has also acceded to the UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances and has invited assistance from the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances.
On September 12, the interim government formed six commissions to recommend reforms to the judiciary, the electoral system, public administration, police, the anti-corruption office, and the constitution. It later established four additional commissions to make policy recommendations on media, health, labor rights, and women’s rights. Students who led the protests have a voice in these commissions.
As of writing, the six main commissions are expected to submit their recommendations by January 15 (January 31 for the judicial reform commission). Then another commission will be formed, comprising the heads of the six commissions, which will be chaired by the chief advisor, Yunus, to forge a consensus around reforms and then to initiate implementation.
Despite these important steps, police have returned to the abusive practices that characterized the previous government, this time targeting supporters—or perceived supporters—of the Awami League government. For instance, in the first two months since the interim government took office, over 1,000 police cases were filed against tens of thousands of people, mainly Awami League members, accusing them of murder, corruption, or other crimes. Over 400 Awami League ministers and leaders are facing investigations. In some of these cases, complainants were not even aware of who was being named as accused. For example, two plaintiffs told Human Rights Watch that local political leaders opposed to the Awami League asked them to sign the police reports, though they were not sure against whom they were filing the cases. Both police and politicians told them that if they wanted the state to recognize their relative’s murder and for them to be honored as martyrs of the uprising, including financial compensation and other reparations, then they needed to sign.
Police have also filed mass criminal complaints against unnamed individuals, a common abusive practice in Bangladesh which allows the police to intimidate and threaten virtually anyone with arrest. Mahfuz Anam, editor of the Daily Star, noted in his column:
Activists warn that those who opposed the Awami League are now mirroring its intolerance for criticism. As of November, authorities had filed murder charges against at least 140 journalists in relation to their reporting on the Monsoon Revolution and scrapped more than 150 press accreditations required to attend official events. When questioned about the criminal cases targeting journalists, Yunus said that the charges had been filed “following the old laws and practices,” underscoring the point that without systemic reform, the target of police will change but the abusive practices will remain the same.
The interim government banned the Chhatra League, the Awami League’s student wing whose members had been accused of repeated involvement in violence on behalf of the Awami League government. However, it has not yet acted against other student and youth political groups similarly accused of involvement in extreme violence.
In another worrying indication for freedom of expression, authorities filed charges of sedition against 19 people for desecrating the national flag, and arrested Chinmoy Krishna Das, an official of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON). On November 27, his supporters violently protested when he was produced in court, and lawyer Saiful Islam, a Muslim member of the prosecution team, was killed.
Das’s arrest came at a time when there is growing concern over attacks on Hindu minorities. The interim government has confirmed that at least 88 cases of communal violence had been registered between August 5 and October 22, and that 70 persons had been arrested. Hindu groups say that there have been hundreds of incidents of vandalism targeting Hindu businesses, homes, and places of worship.
The government has also decided to use the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), a domestic special court previously used to prosecute crimes against humanity committed during Bangladesh’s 1971 war of independence, to prosecute human rights abuses during the Monsoon Revolution. The ICT has previously been fraught with violations of fair trial standards, and while the interim government invited amendments to the Act that establishes the court to bring it in line with international standards, it still lacks some due process protections, and includes the death penalty, in violation of international human rights law. As of November, prosecutors had filed 80 complaints of crimes against humanity and genocide at the Tribunal, including against Sheikh Hasina and senior members of her cabinet. Many of them have fled the country and will likely be prosecuted in absentia.
The Path to Reform
Over the last 15 years, the Hasina government deployed security forces to repress critics and opposition members through enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, surveillance, and torture. As Hasina consolidated power, she also weakened the institutions that would keep her powers in check and maintain oversight and accountability over security forces, including the judiciary and the national human rights commission.
The violent attacks against protesters during the Monsoon Revolution were unprecedented in scale, but the abusive nature of the response was part of a well-established pattern of violent crackdowns on those who challenged the Hasina government. In July 2018, for example, students had mounted similar protests calling for road safety after two students were killed by a speeding bus. As in 2024, Awami League supporters attacked the protesters with machetes and sticks while police stood by or joined in, later using teargas, rubber bullets, and live ammunition against protesters. Security forces followed the same pattern of excessive force in responding to protests leading up to the 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections.
Systemic security force abuses were enabled by a deeply ingrained culture of impunity, alongside the structural dismantling of institutions that would safeguard against abuses. Without urgent structural reform, the abuses of the past could quickly become a blueprint for Bangladesh’s future.
Foreign donors as well as Bangladeshi activists, lawyers, and experts need to examine the failures of the past to protect human rights and address loopholes. Key to this is the separation of powers and building an independent criminal justice system. Donor governments should invest in supporting security sector reform in Bangladesh, including police training, but not without these core structural reforms.
A key concern is to ensure strict political neutrality in the discharge of public duties by restricting and strictly regulating political involvement in personnel-related issues such as recruitment and promotions, including the civil service, police, military, and the judiciary. As the interim government law advisor, Asif Nazrul, recently stated, “the appointment of judges based on political loyalty in the High Court is a major factor behind the collapse of Bangladesh’s judiciary. No matter how sensitive or contentious the term ‘reform’ is, we have no alternative to it.” The interim government should also build independent oversight on the appointment of members and commissioners to all institutions such as the Election Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the National Human Rights Commission, including through civil society consultations.
To end entrenched impunity, the government should repeal or revise laws that undermine or preclude accountability. For example, the interim government should repeal section 197(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires government approval to bring criminal charges against public officials—including police officers—if the offense is committed while the officer is acting or purporting to act in their official capacity; and section 132 of the criminal procedure code requiring prosecutors to obtain a prior government “sanction” before lodging any criminal complaint against a state official, permission that is seldom granted. The armed forces, including those seconded to special units like the Rapid Action Battalion, should be prosecuted in civilian courts for gross human rights violations by amending the Army Act, 1952, Air Force Act, 1953, and Navy Ordinance, 1961 that permit military tribunals jurisdiction over such abuses. The “good faith” clause in section 13 of the Armed Police Battalion (Amendment) Act 2003, which provides blanket immunity for security force abuses, should be removed.
The government should introduce standards on the use of force by requiring mandatory reporting and independent review of all use of force by law enforcement, not just for lethal events or cases involving the use of firearms. The police laws regarding use of force should reflect international standards, including the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials. These standards require that police apply, as far as possible, nonviolent means before resorting to the use of force, that they use force only in proportion to the seriousness of the offense, and that lethal force is used only when strictly unavoidable to protect life.
To end arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances, the interim government should build systems prohibiting filing cases against unnamed accused and mass arrest warrants, revising laws that allow for vague and overly broad charges to target critics. The interim government should establish independent civilian oversight over law enforcement, including through the national human rights commission, with authority to carry out unannounced inspections of all places of detention.
Immediately, the interim government should ensure that no one is detained arbitrarily or otherwise unlawfully. Every person should be detained according to law, with respect for basic due process including being told the date when the authority for their detention expires. Every person detained, for whatever reason, should be brought swiftly—within 24 hours—before a judge or judicial panel which should rule on the legality and necessity of their detention, and any order for release should be immediately complied with.[1] All detention centers should be made public and open to independent inspection. Courts should act speedily on habeas corpus petitions and ensure judicial review of detentions, insisting that the detainee is safely produced before the judge.
The government should publicly and clearly prohibit extrajudicial killings by enacting laws that will hold perpetrators criminally liable. It should ratify the optional protocol to the torture convention and take steps to properly enforce the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act, including by providing public information on the status of complaints, investigations, prosecutions, and redress. It should repeal sections 54 and 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which empower the police to detain people for 15 days without a lawyer, known as remand, a period when authorities frequently carry out torture. It should embark upon urgent prison reforms by enforcing the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-custodial Measures (the Tokyo Rules) and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson Mandela Rules).
The interim government has a maximum of one year to bring these reforms before it holds elections. The international community should urgently assist the government with aid and expertise targeted towards implementing these systemic reforms as a priority above security force training support.
The Yunus government should seek assistance by inviting UN and other experts to investigate and provide recommendations. It should, most urgently, back a consensus resolution at the Human Rights Council to ensure continued monitoring and reporting by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to prevent future governments from undermining the reforms.
