For over five decades, Bangladesh symbolised hard-fought sovereignty, having broken free from Pakistan’s brutal repression in 1971. Yet, with Sheikh Hasina’s removal from power on August 5, 2024, the country has embarked on a path that seemingly threatens to undo decades of independence. No longer an autonomous actor, Bangladesh appears to be drawn into a geopolitical axis where Pakistan acts as an intermediary, but China is the true master.
Bangladesh-Pakistan Rapprochement: A Chinese-Driven Shift
Since the fall of the Awami League government, Bangladesh’s new leadership has been observed actively reshaping its foreign policy, discarding its past hostilities with Pakistan. This shift became evident in September 2024, when interim Prime Minister Muhammad Yunus met Pakistan’s Nawaz Sharif at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The two leaders later expanded discussions at the D-8 Summit in December, reportedly engaging in talks on military and intelligence cooperation—an unprecedented move since Bangladesh’s independence.
By early 2025, these developments had translated into significant military realignments. Bangladesh, which had long avoided cooperation with Pakistan, reversed its stance by agreeing to joint training programs and military exchanges. The most striking development occurred in January 2025 when Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, hosted Bangladesh’s Principal Staff Officer, Lieutenant General S M Kamr-ul-Hassan, in Islamabad. The result was an expanded defence collaboration, further aligning Bangladesh with Pakistan’s security apparatus.
Dhaka’s shift towards Pakistan was further highlighted when Bangladesh participated in Pakistan’s Aman 2025 naval exercises—a move that previous governments had deliberately avoided for over a decade. An even more striking indication of this evolving military realignment emerged in August 2024 when Bangladesh imported significant quantities of arms and ammunition from Pakistan, including 40,000 rounds of ammunition, 2,000 tank shells, 40 tons of RDX explosives, and nearly 3,000 high-intensity projectiles. However, the most unexpected and consequential shift occurred when reports surfaced in December 2024 suggesting that, for the first time since 1971, the Pakistan Army had reached an agreement to train the Bangladesh Army—an arrangement viewed by many as not only surprising but deeply ironic, given the historical context.
Historically, Bangladesh and Pakistan have had a tumultuous relationship, marked by Dhaka’s resistance to Islamabad’s influence. The wounds of 1971, exacerbated by Pakistan’s refusal to acknowledge its past crimes and Dhaka’s war crimes trials, have long shaped the nation’s foreign policy. The current rapprochement, therefore, stands in stark contrast to past diplomatic realities.
Additionally, recent developments indicate that Bangladesh’s participation in regional military exercises involving China is becoming more frequent. With China exerting influence over multilateral drills, such as Aman 2025, concerns have arisen about Bangladesh’s growing exposure to Beijing-led security cooperation. China has historically used such exercises to familiarise nations with its military doctrines, subtly reinforcing dependence on its weapons, training, and tactics.
These military transactions are not isolated incidents but part of what appears to be China’s broader strategy to integrate Bangladesh into a China-controlled security framework, where Pakistan plays the role of enforcer, but Beijing holds the real power.
The Return of ISI: Intelligence Subversion in Dhaka
Beyond military ties, an even more insidious transformation is unfolding—the resurgence of Pakistan’s notorious intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), within Bangladesh’s security establishment. Under Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh actively dismantled ISI’s operations within its borders, ensuring its intelligence services remained insulated from external infiltration. However, with Hasina’s departure, those security measures seem to be collapsing.
Dhaka’s intelligence agencies, which previously kept ISI at bay, are now reportedly re-establishing direct links with Pakistan’s intelligence network. This includes the reinstatement of intelligence-sharing agreements and the return of ISI operatives to Bangladesh’s security circles. These changes do not merely signify a renewed relationship with Pakistan but indicate a broader strategy—one that ultimately strengthens China’s hold over Bangladesh’s security infrastructure.
Pakistan’s ISI does not function independently; it operates as an extension of Beijing’s security complex. By allowing ISI to infiltrate its intelligence network, Dhaka is seemingly granting China deeper access to its national security apparatus. The implications are significant—Bangladesh’s security strategies, counterterrorism operations, and intelligence policies may no longer be dictated solely by its own national interests but by the broader China-Pakistan intelligence nexus.
China’s Grand Plan: Subjugation Through Proxy Control
While Bangladesh’s leaders frame these developments as strategic diplomacy, observers suggest the real force behind this shift is China. Beijing has seemingly perfected a model for turning nations into subservient states, using a three-stage process:
Economic Entrapment – China embeds itself into a country’s economy through large-scale infrastructure projects and loans, creating financial dependence. Bangladesh, now China’s largest trading partner in South Asia, is showing increasing signs of financial reliance on Beijing.
Military Integration – By ensuring reliance on Chinese-made weaponry, training programs, and joint military exercises, Beijing exerts control over a nation’s defence policies. Bangladesh’s increasing defence collaboration with Pakistan, a military client of China, appears to be a direct outcome of this strategy.
Intelligence Subjugation – By using Pakistan’s ISI as an intermediary, China is said to be infiltrating Bangladesh’s intelligence structure, aligning Dhaka’s security priorities with its own regional ambitions.
Pakistan’s role in facilitating China’s influence has evolved significantly. No longer merely a passive recipient of Chinese investments, Islamabad now appears to be actively extending Beijing’s reach into Bangladesh. With its own deepening dependence on Chinese financial and military support, Pakistan seems to be leveraging its relationship with Bangladesh to align Dhaka with China’s geopolitical priorities. This shift suggests that Pakistan is not merely a proxy but a strategic facilitator of China’s regional ambitions.
China’s strategic vision extends beyond Bangladesh. Beijing has steadily expanded its influence over Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, integrating them into its economic and security frameworks. Bangladesh now seems to be the latest addition to this pattern, particularly in alignment with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The same tactics were used in Pakistan through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), ensuring Islamabad’s economic dependence on Beijing. Pakistan’s military, once an independent force, now sources 72% of its modern weaponry from China, making it reliant on Beijing’s supply chains. Pakistan’s internal security policies—including counterterrorism operations in Balochistan—are dictated by China’s strategic investments.
Bangladesh’s Fate: A Nation Losing Its Sovereignty?
For decades, Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan was a defining moment in its history. It proved that a nation could break free from military subjugation and forge its own path. However, today, that sovereignty appears to be at risk—not through war, but through a carefully orchestrated process of economic, military, and intelligence subjugation.
China’s growing influence, facilitated by Pakistan’s security and intelligence networks, is quietly embedding itself into Bangladesh’s governance. Observers warn that the lines between economic partnership and political subordination are beginning to blur.
While Bangladesh’s government presents these developments as part of its ‘diplomatic diversification,’ history suggests a different trajectory. Pakistan, once an independent actor, is now widely regarded as a client state of Beijing. Bangladesh may not be far behind.
The question is no longer whether Bangladesh will fall under China’s influence—that process appears to be well underway. The only remaining question is: How long before Dhaka How long before Dhaka realises the full extent of its strategic entrapment?
