On 25-26 August, more than 70 people – including 23 civilians – were reported killed and key infrastructure damaged in a series of attacks across Pakistan’s southwestern province of Balochistan. The armed separatist group, the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), has claimed responsibility for the attacks.
Created in the early 2000s, the BLA, together with other militant groups, has waged a decades-long campaign against Pakistan’s government which is accused of unfairly appropriating Balochistan’s rich gas and mineral reserves. Severe economic deprivation has compounded these grievances. Balochistan is the largest and least populated of Pakistan’s provinces and the most impoverished, with an estimated 70 per cent per cent of its population classed as ‘multidimensionally poor’.
While the latest attacks were widely blamed on intelligence failures, they have also raised serious questions about recent government claims that the Baloch insurgency and its leadership are significantly weakened. The scale of these closely coordinated attacks suggests otherwise.
Not only do they point to an insurgency that appears to be far from over, but also to a still robust and sophisticated militant organization with ambitions to widen its appeal by tapping into Baloch nationalist sentiment. The BLA’s attacks were timed to coincide with the anniversary of the death of the influential Baloch tribal leader, Akbar Khan Bugti, who was killed in a confrontation with Pakistani security forces on 26 August 2006.
The latest attacks have prompted concern about the risks posed to major infrastructure projects located in Balochistan, including the development of the Indian Ocean port of Gwadar, part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and a planned mining operation at Reqo Dik in Chagai district. Such projects are targets of Baloch resentment and in recent years almost a dozen Chinese nationals have been killed by Baloch militants in Balochistan and elsewhere in Pakistan.
Added to these concerns are fears of fresh tension between Pakistan and its regional neighbours. In January, the BLA was at the centre of allegations by Pakistan over the use of militant bases in Iran to stage attacks against Pakistan. They led to tit-for-tat cross-border missile and air strikes that almost brought Iran and Pakistan to the brink of war. Pakistan has again blamed regional neighbours, notably India, for supporting the latest attacks as a move to undermine CPEC and frighten other foreign investors.
Pakistan has also levelled allegations against the Taliban government in Afghanistan for fuelling militant violence through its support for the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) and its allies, including the BLA.
What is new about this insurgency?
There is mounting evidence of a shift in the composition and pattern of the current phase of the Baloch insurgency, making its trajectory hard to predict.
The most significant change is the involvement of a growing number of educated middle-class professionals who are transforming the insurgency from a movement dominated by traditional tribal chiefs to one with greater popular appeal. The BLA, in particular, is said to have become a magnet for such groups, who favour ‘modern and unconventional’ thinking.
There is also the increasing involvement of women, a radical departure in one of Pakistan’s most socially conservative provinces. On 26 August the BLA released images of a woman law student from Gwadar who it said was the suicide bomber responsible for the attacks on a paramilitary base in Lasbela. In April 2022, a Baloch woman with a graduate degree in medicine was identified as the suicide bomber who killed three Chinese nationals at the University of Karachi.
There is also the rise of an increasingly vocal Baloch rights-based movement, the Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC or Baloch Unity Committee), comprising mainly of women activists and led by the charismatic young female doctor, Mahrang Baloch. Dedicated to non-violence, it aims to raise national awareness of extra-judicial killings and so-called ‘enforced disappearances’ involving ethnic Baloch. An estimated 5,000 Baloch are said to have gone missing since 2000.
Another trend within the current insurgency is the creeping xenophobia and hostility towards non-Baloch ethnic groups, many of whom are drawn to Balochistan from elsewhere in Pakistan by the prospect of economic opportunities and work on local projects.
Ethnic Punjabis, who tend to dominate the security forces, have been especially vulnerable to local resentment. In the latest attacks, all the civilians reported killed by the BLA were identified as Punjabi workers, which seems to confirm concerns they are being deliberately targeted by militants.
Much of the hostility against migrant workers is rooted in the fears of ethnic Baloch that they could be reduced to a minority in the province or lose out in competition for jobs to relatively better qualified workers from Punjab.
How will the government respond?
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has denounced the attacks as a ‘wicked scheme’ by the ‘enemies of Pakistan’, labelling the BLA khawarij or ‘deviators from Islam’. His government has promised to take stern action and within hours of the attacks it approved $72 million for the military to support its fight against armed groups in Balochistan.
But so far there has been no indication that the government is willing to address the Baloch grievances that have fuelled political alienation. This has led to concerns that Pakistan’s powerful military establishment will be pursuing a heavy-handed security response to deal with what is widely judged to be a political crisis.
It comes following the June announcement of a new counter-insurgency operation – the latest of many – designed to contain militant threats from Baloch insurgents and the TTP.. Some have questioned its capacity to deliver where other such strategies have failed, while others believe it was devised in response to pressure from China to beef up security for Chinese-led projects.
But there were other signs before the attacks that the military was gearing up for confrontation with Baloch dissidents. In a veiled reference to the BYC, which staged an unprecedented wave of non-violent demonstrations across Balochistan in July, army chief General Asim Munir warned that action by ‘some elements’ to ‘destabilize Balochistan’ would not be allowed. In early August, a senior military spokesman denounced the BYC as a proxy of terrorist organizations.
Pressing ahead with a militarized security approach to address the crisis in Balochistan is a worrying indication that lessons from the past have not been learned. All signs point to a dangerous replay of past mistakes, whereby political engagement is dismissed in favour of political management: backing groups that owe their existence to the military and will do its bidding.
The outcomes of the 2018 and 2024 elections, which installed provincial governments in Balochistan with close ties to the military, stand as damning testimony to these misjudged priorities.
Ultimately, the escalating violence and continuing turmoil in Balochistan is a reflection of the abject failure to provide meaningful representation to the Baloch and to address their grievances which have simmered since the inception of Pakistan in 1947.
In the face of an increasingly sophisticated insurgency with the power to extend its reach across vast swathes of civil society in Balochistan, resorting to brute force is no longer an option – if it ever was. The only way forward lies in opening channels of communication with genuine representatives accountable to the people of Balochistan rather than to Pakistan’s armed custodians of power.
